Influencing Politics vs. Intervening Politics: The Anatomy of Lobbying Institution in Taiwan
Chen-Kuo Shih*
Abstract
In a democratic society, lobbying is not only a channel for citizens to express their opinions and demands, but it also has the function of legislative subsidy. However, it has also created the problem of unequal accessibility owing to the unhealthy implementation environment. In order to create a balance between influencing politics and intervening politics, establishing a holistic lobbying system is an important issue of effective operation of democracy. This paper applies theory-driven evaluation to evaluate the content, implementation environment and outcome of the Lobbying Act in Taiwan. Based on this evaluation, the paper finds that legislative goals and relevant rules, such as the enforcement of lobbyist registration, disclosure of lobbying records, prohibition of “revolving-door” governing the relations between lobbyists and former public officials and severe punishment regulations of illegal lobbying, are very progressive and constructive. However, a vague definition of lobbying and a lack of incentives for government institutions to implement relevant regulations may induce illegal lobbying. As regard to the evaluation of implementation environment, target groups did not have the willingness to comply with related regulations owing to the fact that diversified government bodies are given the mandate to implement the Act and yet none has the power of oversight; there are no effective arrangements of good network governance. Finally, the goals of information disclosure, compliance of lobbyists and punishment of illegal lobbying were not achieved according to the outcome evaluation. Some policy suggestions were provided against the flaws of the Lobbying Act.
Keywords: lobbying, Lobbying Act, theory-driven evaluation
* Assistant Professor, Department of Public Administration, Chung Hua University, Hsin-Chu City.
http://www.exam.gov.tw/public/Data/052816294471.pdf