促進民間參與公共建設政策為何成為台北市政府的選擇？ －交易成本理論的初探性應用
吳宗憲、曾凱毅
《摘要》
根據資料顯示，台北市政府促參案件中存在著民間公司透過代理人結構謀求私利益而影響公共利益的問題，但吾人卻也發現近年來促參政策數量仍然大行其道，並未因代理人問題的曝光而有減少，經本研究對利害相關人進行深度訪談之後了解，政府官僚並非「無法」或「無能」知悉企業所造成的代理人問題，只是政府在了解這些代理人問題之後，相較於其全盤的「交易成本」最大化考量，仍然必須做出「刻意忽略」代理人問題的「不得已」選擇。本研究即是透過交易成本理論當中的承諾成本、代理成本、決策成本以及風險及不確定性成本等概念，用來說明此種政府在選擇政策時刻意「設計出的無效率」（inefficiency by design）現象。
[關鍵詞]：台北市促進民間參與政策、交易成本理論、代理人理 論、公私協力
Why Has the Policy of Promoting Private Participation in Infrastructure Projects Become the Choice of Taipei City Government? - Pioneering Application of Transaction Cost Theory
Chuangh-Sien Wu, Kai-Yi Tseng
Abstract
According to available data, the policy of promoting private participation in infrastructure project in Taipei city has caused serious principle/agent problems. However, the cases of promoting private participation are still increasing. We find that public servants know the principle/agent cost, but after comparing total transaction costs, they still choose to promote private participation in building the city’s infrastructure to provide public service.
In the article, we’ll show how commitment cost, agent cost, decision cost and uncertainty cost -- the so-called transaction cost -- can be combined to demonstrate government’s inefficiency by design.
Keywords: promotion of private participation in infrastructure policy in Taipei city, transaction cost theory, agent theory, public-private cooperation